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Abstract
Do states use trade to reward and punish partners? WTO rules and the pressures of globalization
restrict states’ capacity to manipulate trade policies, but we argue that governments can link political
goals with economic outcomes using less direct avenues of influence over firm behavior. Where
governments intervene in markets, politicization of trade is likely to occur. In this paper, we examine
one important form of government control: state ownership of firms. Taking China and India as
examples, we use bilateral trade data by firm ownership type, as well as measures of bilateral political
relations based on diplomatic events and UN voting to estimate the effect of political relations on
import and export flows. Our results support the hypothesis that imports controlled by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) exhibit stronger responsiveness to political relations than imports controlled by
private enterprises. A more nuanced picture emerges for exports; while India’s exports through SOEs
are more responsive to political tensions than its flows through private entities, the opposite is true
for China. This research holds broader implications for how we should think about the relationship
between political and economic relations going forward, especially as a number of countries with
partially state-controlled economies gain strength in the global economy.
1 Introduction
Powerful states have a long tradition of economic statecraft. During the Cold War, trade patterns closely
reflected political relations (e.g. Pollins, 1989; Gowa, 1994; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; Keshk,
Reuveny and Pollins, 2004; Berger et al., 2013). Governments today, however, have less leeway for
using trade as carrot and stick in foreign policy. Global trade rules restrict the ability of governments
to discriminate among trading partners, and transnational production further complicates efforts to link
trade to foreign policy (Gowa and Mansfield, 2004; Brooks, 2007; Davis and Meunier, 2011; Carnegie,
2014). This paper revisits the question of whether trade follows the flag and highlights state ownership
of firms as a key means for politicization of trade.
Widely reported incidents suggest that governments continue to manipulate trade in response to po-
litical disputes. In 2014, for example, the United States and the EU announced a range of economic
penalties to punish Russian intervention in Ukraine, and Russia retaliated with its own boycotts of agri-
cultural products from Europe. Politically-motivated trade disruptions, however, are not limited to formal
declarations of economic sanctions about use of force. The methods of manipulation are often more sub-
tle than the public economic sanctions or trade agreements that are a large focus in the literature on
economic statecraft. In many cases, officials approach firms directly to request that they restrict trade or
change suppliers rather than adopting formal policy changes. Consequently, trade manipulation depends
critically on the government’s ability to influence decision-making at the firm level. In 2012, Telam,
Argentina’s official news outlet, reported that ministry officials had asked some 20 companies to cease
importing materials from the UK in response to diplomatic tensions over the Falkland (Malvinas) Is-
lands.1 China made waves in 2010 when it cut off exports of rare earths minerals to Japan supposedly
1 “Falklands dispute: Argentina ‘urges UK import ban,”’ BBC News, February 28, 2012. See http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-latin-america-17200528
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in response to a territorial dispute in the East China Sea and again when it halted fresh salmon imports
from Norway after the Nobel Committee awarded its Peace Prize to Chinese human rights activist Liu
Xiaobo.
We argue that government influence over firms makes trade flows more responsive to foreign rela-
tions. Through state ownership of firms, governments gain an important tool for the exercise of economic
statecraft. These firms are more likely to align their behavior with state interests because of close de-
pendence at the level of both firm personnel and finances. Where private firms must trade on the basis
of commercial interests, state-owned firms also pursue government interests. As a result, we expect the
effect of political relations on trade to be a function of state control. To test this proposition, we compare
trade flows through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with trade through private firms. A comparison of
bilateral trade flows by firm ownership offers an identification strategy for testing our argument about
state control.
We focus our analysis on two important cases: China and India. Both are global players with active
foreign policy agendas whose economies rank among the largest in the world.2 Most critically, China
and India retain high levels of state ownership in some sectors of the economy alongside other sectors
with little state involvement. In 2013, these two countries comprised the largest numbers of SOEs on the
Forbes list of the world’s 2000 largest public companies.3 Production by SOEs is estimated to account
for about a third of China’s GDP and 6.45 percent of India’s.4 Our analysis of economic statecraft
in emerging markets and our use of new trade data disaggregated by firm ownership make an original
2 At the time of writing, China is the world’s second largest economy and India the tenth, as determined by GDP. Together,
these countries accounted for 13.0 percent of world exports and 12.7 percent of world imports in 2012 (WTO, 2013).
3 SOEs comprise the majority of total firms on the list for both China (90 of 136 firms) and India (31 of 56 firms). Included
in the SOE count for China are subsidiaries with SOE parents. See http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/
and Naazneen Karmali, “India faces reality check in latest Global 2000,” Forbes Business, April 27, 2013. Figure for China
by authors’ calculation.
4 The China estimate is for 2009 and the India estimate is for 2010/11. Simon Rabinovitch, “Private sector battles march
of Chinese state,” Financial Times, November 11, 2012. See also OECD (2009) and Government of India (2011, p. 14).
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contribution to the literature.
Our argument challenges the view that market expectations alone shape economic decisions and
highlights the ongoing role of the state in trade discrimination, even within an era of high interdepen-
dence. Theories of conflict and interdependence emphasize firms’ anticipation of increased trade costs
brought on by the outbreak of war (Pollins, 1989; Morrow, Siverson and Tabares, 1998; Morrow, 1999;
Long, 2008). But it may be state intervention rather than market forecasts that shift trade away from part-
ners in times of discord. Economic patriotism is apparent across a range of regulatory policies and has
been shown to motivate selective liberalization as well as protection (Levy, 2006; Clift and Woll, 2012;
Rickard and Kono, forthcoming). Berger et al. (2013) find that the positive impact of CIA interventions
on US imports by a country is conditional on the government’s share of the economy. This finding high-
lights the role of the state in politicizing trade, but it does not clearly define the channel through which
governments generate this effect. Here we demonstrate how states manipulate trade as a tool of foreign
policy through their influence over state-owned firms.
Whereas much of the literature on conflict and interdependence focuses on militarized disputes, we
examine a broader range of variation in political relations including lower-level frictions, such as threats,
complaints, and diplomatic spats. Issues that fall well short of war and even appear minor in isolation
may have a larger cumulative effect on interstate relations. Political relations are measured by negative
political events and voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). We hypothesize
that worsening political relations will prompt the state to pursue economic statecraft where it has the most
leverage. Across these different measures of relations, we expect more negative political relations to
correspond with lower trade, with the most pronounced effect in trade flows through SOEs. We examine
the effects of political relations on imports and exports separately. In the mercantilist framework of
most governments, limiting or seeking other sources of imports will be preferred to restricting exports.
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Nevertheless, we recognize that there may be some circumstances under which states would focus on
exports as a tool of statecraft. For example, Russia’s manipulation of gas exports in 2006 and 2009 amidst
long-standing disputes with Ukraine, China’s above-mentioned restrictions on rare earth exports, and the
West’s blockade of certain technology exports for the Russian energy sector represent high-profile cases
where dominant market position over strategic goods allowed the use of export restrictions as a tool of
statecraft.
Our statistical analysis of annual bilateral trade by China and India since the early 1990s through
2012 demonstrates that negative bilateral events correspond with a reduction in imports and exports. In
our comparison of the impact of political relations by state ownership of the trading firms, we find the
relationship is significantly greater for imports by firms in the state-owned sector of the economy. The
strength of the findings varies across the different measures of political relations, but is generally robust
to alternative specifications. The results are more mixed for exports. While in India there is evidence
of greater trade politicization in the state-controlled sector as hypothesized, in China it would appear
that—if anything—the private sector experiences a larger trade response to negative political relations
than the state-controlled sector.
Our research indicates that economic statecraft remains relevant in the current era of globalization.
Trade patterns respond to political relations in areas where governments maintain the capacity to ma-
nipulate trade. Even as market-oriented policies and free-trade rules expand, important pockets of state
control remain, particularly in many emerging economies, where state-owned firms assume a grow-
ing role in critical sectors and increasingly participate actively in the global trading system (Kowalski
et al., 2013). Indeed, after the widespread privatizations of the 1980s and 1990s, the governments of
a number of these countries—China, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Russia among them—have
reversed course and taken steps to expand the number and size of state-owned enterprises in key sectors
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and develop corporate “champions.”5 Studies that focus on the OECD countries and aggregate trade
flows neglect the wide variation among countries and sectors in the relationship between governments
and firms. We specify an important pathway through which a government’s role in the economy shapes
economic flows.
The paper proceeds as follows: the second section presents a brief overview of the literature and
introduces some motivating examples of cases in which China and India limited trade in response to
political conflicts; the third section discusses the argument and hypothesis; the fourth section presents
the data; the fifth section describes the empirical strategy and discusses the results; the final section
concludes.
2 Economic Statecraft in Theory and Practice
Economic interdependence has long played a contested role in theories of international relations. As a
component of state power, economic wealth is central to realist theories. Major powers seek to avoid
trade with adversaries who could use the wealth generated by trade to purchase security advantages
(Gowa, 1994). Interdependence introduces vulnerability as the outbreak of conflict reduces trade (Keshk,
Reuveny and Pollins, 2004). Trade relations may be used as a means of control (Hirschman, [1945] 1980;
Lake, 2009), and alliances have long corresponded with favorable economic agreements (Mansfield and
Bronson, 1997; Long and Leeds, 2006). This supports the expectation that states will structure their
economic relations on the basis of political relations and will manipulate such dependency as part of
coercive strategies.
Liberal theories place more emphasis on the constraining dynamic of economic ties. States act on the
5 SOEs account for 80 percent of China’s stock market, 62 percent of Russia’s, and 38 percent of Brazil’s, for example,
and increasingly occupy the ranks of the world’s largest firms. See “The Visible Hand,” The Economist, January 21, 2012.
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interests of social actors within the state, and the economic gains from interdependence may encourage
cooperative relations under commercial liberalism (Polachek, 1980; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Li and
Sacko, 2002; Gartzke, 2007; Lee and Mitchell, 2012). While most attention is paid to the claim that
trade promotes peace, there is a prior assumption that a break in political relations would interfere with
economic exchange. Trade follows the flag because firms expect a lower likelihood of disruptive conflict
when trading with states that share good relations (Pollins, 1989; Long, 2008).
Thus from both perspectives, one would expect to observe a correlation between political and eco-
nomic relations. Changes in the past two decades in the political and economic structure of international
politics elicit the need to reassess these claims, however. The end of the Cold War reduced the ex-
pectation of realist theories for strong differentiation among partners (Gowa, 1989). Global production
networks and high levels of intra-industry trade in the current era of globalization raise sunk costs in
specialized production and trade relationships, which slows the response of economic actors to political
shifts (Davis and Meunier, 2011). The expanding membership and strength of the WTO has restricted
states’ ability to link trade to external issues, thus reducing the scope for economic statecraft.6 Are pat-
terns of economic exchange swayed by politics in a global economy? What are the channels by which
governments could induce trade patterns to follow foreign policy interests?
2.1 Examples of Punishment
China offers a test of these theories given its status both as a major power and a country deeply embedded
in global trade. Significant attention has been paid to China’s use of investment and aid policies to win
influence (e.g. Dreher and Fuchs, forthcoming; Cheung et al., 2012; Li and Liang, 2012). Recent disputes
suggest that the Chinese government is also willing and able to use its economic weight to punish states
6 See Keohane (1984, p. 92) for an explanation of issue linkages in international institutions generally and Gowa (2010)
and Carnegie (2014) for more explanation of how the trade regime insures states against foreign policy linkages.
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through trade. For example, Fuchs and Klann (2013) find that countries whose leadership receives the
Dalai Lama suffer from a temporary reduction of exports to China. Hong et al. (2010) show evidence
of a successful boycott of French automobiles in the wake of Sino-French tensions in the run-up to the
2008 Beijing Olympics. In this section, we present three cases that motivate our research. The first case
highlights import barriers and the second focuses on export restrictions imposed by China. The third
extends the analysis to India and looks at India-Pakistan relations as an example of trade affected by
ongoing political tensions.
Chinese Boycott of Norwegian Salmon
The announcement on October 8, 2010 that the Norwegian Nobel Committee had awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize to Chinese human rights activist Liu Xiaobo set off a controversy in Norway-China relations.
The Chinese government immediately protested the decision with public statements charging that Liu
was a criminal and warning that selecting him for the award could harm China-Norway ties.7 With a
former Norwegian prime minister on the committee, it was difficult for the Norwegian government to
distance itself from the award. Three days later, the Chinese government canceled a scheduled meeting
with the Norwegian fisheries minister after her arrival in China, which Norwegian officials attributed to
“reaction to the Nobel Peace Prize.”8
These would not be the only repercussions. A new set of veterinary controls imposed at ports in
China on fresh salmon had immediate effects. The data in Figure 1 reveal the sharp drop in fresh salmon
exports from Norway to China compared with those to the rest of the world after the announcement of
the Peace Prize. The controls appeared to be Norway-specific; while Norwegian salmon was reported to
7 Zheng Xinyi, “Beijing blasts Nobel Peace Prize Meddling,” People’s Daily Online, October 9, 2010. http:
//english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7160366.html.
8 Sharon LaFraniere, “Chinese Cancel Meeting with Norwegian Minister,” New York Times, October 11, 2010.
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be left rotting in the ports, Scottish salmon encountered no obstacles.9 Indeed, salmon exports from the
UK enjoyed a brief surge beginning in January 2011, just as those from Norway plunged. Since then,
Scottish salmon has generally kept apace with its Norwegian competitors, and Norway’s exports did not
return to 2010 levels until the middle of 2012. In the right-hand graph of Figure 1, the effect on total
exports from Norway to China is less visible and—if anything—delayed. The delay might be a result of
the freeze on diplomatic contact between governments.10 Norway’s total exports to China appear to have
decreased slightly one year after the bestowal of the Peace Prize, while the country’s exports to the rest
of the world increased by 11 percent. Another consequence to bilateral relations was China’s decision to
halt plans to sign a free trade agreement with Norway.
The Chinese government is heavily involved in the fishing sector. State ownership in fishing is about
10 percent overall and 30 percent in distance-water fishing, the sub-sector most likely to compete with
foreign suppliers. One SOE, China National Fisheries Corporation, and its subsidiaries account for about
a third of total sector production in distance fishing. Furthermore, the government maintains stakes in
fish processing and distribution, as well as retail sales, extending its leverage over the entire length of the
production chain. While only 369 of the roughly 8,000 enterprises involved in fish processing are state-
owned, these firms account for 18 percent of the industry’s processing capacity and almost 30 percent of
cold storage capacity, making the state a big player in distribution (Fan and Yu, 2004, p.18).11 Among
the top 100 food retailers in China, 45 percent are SOEs.12 Thus from port to supermarket, a sizeable
share of the stakeholders that would have been affected by the boycott were state-owned.
9 “Norway’s salmon rot as China takes revenge for dissident’s Nobel Prize,” The Independent, October 6, 2011.
10 Diplomatic contact can be a tool to foster commerce (e.g. Rose, 2007). The empirical results in Nitsch (2007), for
example, show that state visits cause an increase in bilateral trade.
11 Figures as of 2002.
12 Figure as of 2004. See China Chain Store and Franchise Association’s ”China Top 100 Chain Retailers, 2007” available
at http://www.chinaretail.org/reports.asp.
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Figure 1: Salmon Boycott: Norwegian exports before and after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize. Values are
normalized to take a value of 1 in the last quarter of 2010 when the Nobel Peace Prize was conferred.
Source: Eurostat, with authors’ calculations
Chinese Rare Earth Embargo on Japan
During this same period, Japan experienced problems with China after the Japanese Coast Guard ar-
rested the crew of a Chinese fishing boat on September 7, 2010, during a hostile encounter in the waters
surrounding the disputed territory of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Amidst anti-Japanese demonstrations
in Beijing and a halt to cabinet-level exchanges, relations worsened as Japan extended its detention of the
fishing boat captain. Evidence of targeted economic retaliation began to appear.13 In an event study anal-
ysis of stock market returns, Fisman, Hamao and Wang (forthcoming) demonstrate that Japanese firms
with more exposure to trade with China experienced an adverse impact. Furthermore, they find that at
13 “Chugoku kakuryo koryu wo teishi (China stops cabinet level exchanges),” Asahi Shimbun, September 21, 2010.
9
the time of the incident, Chinese sectors with high SOE intensity lowered their trade with Japanese firms
more than sectors dominated by private firms.
Most significantly, Japan reported the stoppage of rare earth exports from China, which threatened to
cut off a vital resource used as an input by Japanese companies for everything from engines for electric
and hybrid autos to industrial batteries and flat screen LCD displays. Given that China supplied over
ninety percent of the global supply of rare earth elements, the prospect of an embargo was quite serious.
A survey of Japanese firms by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry found that those directly en-
gaged in trading rare earths reported that barriers to exports from China had increased starting September
21 and included problems gaining export licenses and demands for translation of documents.14
Possibly fearful of a WTO violation, the Chinese government denied that there was any boycott
against Japan specifically and widened the restrictions on exports, which it then justified as serving
environmental concerns regarding the sustainable development of natural resources.15 The release of
the Chinese captain on September 25 removed the most direct source of tensions, and rare earth exports
from China to Japan began to increase in November.16 Tensions over the islands spiked again in August
and September 2012 with widespread and violent demonstrations in China against Japan’s decision to
nationalize the islands. This time economic repercussions were immediate, and a range of Japanese firms
experienced decreasing sales and unusual delays at customs ports.17
The Chinese government’s tight control over the rare earths industry facilitated the informal export
14 “Chugoku ni okeru yushutsunyu jyoukyo ni kan suru chyosa kekka (Results of a survey regarding exports and imports
from China),” October 5, 2010. Summary of survey provided to authors.
15 “China is said to widen its embargo of rare earth minerals to Western countries,” New York Times, October 20, 2010.
16 While a short-term embargo can slip by WTO rules as a ’hit-and-run’ by eliminating the policy before another country
can file a complaint, in this case China continued to impose some restrictions, and Japan joined with the US and EU to file a
WTO complaint against the export restrictions in March 2012.
17 See report by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) entitled “Chugoku
ni okeru tsukan no jyokyo (The Customs Situation in China)” and available at
http://www.jetro.go.jp/world/asia/cn/custom/.
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embargo in 2010. Comprised of about 90 companies, the largest of which are centrally state-owned,
the sector is highly concentrated and largely in state hands. Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth
Hi-Tech, a subsidiary of major SOE Batou Iron and Steel Group, dominates mining in the north. SOE
China Minmetals controls the south. Other major players include SOE China Nonferrous Metal Mining
(Group) Co., Ltd and Aluminum Corporation of China, Ltd (Chalco), a state-backed holding company.
Since 2006 the government has controlled the total-amount exploitation of rare earths and has exercised
management over rare earths production by mandatory planning since 2007. As of 2014, the government
is working to consolidate the entire industry into three large state-run conglomerates through a process
of mandated mergers and acquisitions.18
These examples highlight several dimensions that we focus on in this paper. First, China has shown
it can use economic channels to punish states that displease the central government. Second, the mech-
anism is more subtle than publicly announced sanctions. Instead, a range of new standards, informal
guidance, and customs procedures appear as culprit. Does the large role of the government in the econ-
omy facilitate China’s behavior in these and other such cases?
The Case of Ongoing Tensions: India and Pakistan
The enduring rivalry between Pakistan and India offers an example where negative relations have sup-
pressed trade over decades. Trade between the countries had almost completely halted during the 1960s
and 1970s when the countries experienced two wars and imposed import restrictions, and have never fully
recovered to the levels one would normally expect between neighboring countries. Naqvi and Schuler
(2007) point out that bilateral trade is low in both absolute and relative terms; the sum of bilateral exports
18 According to a June 2012 government White Paper (State Council, 2012), the government launched its plan to “exercise
planned regulation and control, restrictive exploitation, tightened access and comprehensive utilization for rare earths....” in
2008 under the National Plan for Mineral Resources (2008-2015), re-assuming the authority for “registering, examining and
approving the prospecting and mining of specified minerals” in 2009.
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constitutes a tiny 0.9 percent of the pair’s total exports and is small when compared to other similar pairs
of countries or against projections of trade potential.19
While the two countries agreed to confidence-building measures in the face of their rival nuclear
tests in 1998, conflict in Kashmir worsened. In May 1999 India engaged in airstrikes in Kashmir’s
Kargil sector against militants who allegedly received support from Pakistan. Pressure from the major
powers led to negotiations that defused the immediate crisis. The December 2001 suicide squad attacks
on the Indian Parliament prompted both countries to mobilize troops and missiles such that they were
reported to be on “war footing.”20 These negative events had an impact on trade. India’s imports from
Pakistan fell by more than half from 75.4 million in 2001 to 36.7 million in 2002, although exports
remained steady, and imports returned to 68.7 million in 2003 (all values in constant 2005 US$) .
Unstable political relations have made firms reluctant to make risky investments even where there are
not formal barriers (Naqvi and Schuler, 2007, p. 6). Both governments impose lengthy lists of sensitive
goods restricted from bilateral trade, and Pakistan has long denied most favored nation status to India.
The start of a strategic dialogue between the two countries in 2004 under pressure from the United States
began a process of improving trade relations with a gradual reduction of barriers and possibility that
Pakistan would grant India MFN status in 2014. While these are signs of possible improvement, the
overall pattern shows two governments that have taken every step possible over the years to reduce the
level of trade within the context of ongoing tensions.
19 In the same volume, Baroncelli (2007) uses a gravity model analysis of trade flows to estimate that in absence of conflict,
India and Pakistan would benefit from an annual peace dividend of more than three billion dollars in additional trade.
20 Cecilia W. Dugger, “India and Pakistan Add to War Footing,” New York Times, December 28, 2001.
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3 State Control and Non-commercial Interests in Trade
From the examples above, we see evidence that governments intervene in trade for a range of events from
seemingly minor issues to enduring rivalries that involve militarized conflict. Under what conditions do
such political tensions impact bilateral trade? In this section we explain why state control of firms
increases the ability of government to manipulate trade. Through firm ownership, the state can inject
non-commercial considerations into business decisions.
The exercise of economic statecraft has distributional consequences both at home and abroad. The
objective is to punish or reward another state for its policy position or attempt to influence its behavior.
Denying key resources or market opportunities harms the target state, while preferential access offers
benefits. Using economic policy to achieve foreign policy goals, however, can produce negative exter-
nalities for the domestic market. To the extent that the state encourages a move away from the market
equilibrium, some firms will suffer costs. Indeed, the domestic costs of economic sanctions enhance their
credibility as a signal of resolve.21 Despite possible foreign policy gains, economic decisions dictated by
geopolitical interests may not coincide with the best economic outcomes.
Several studies find that harm to economic actors at home limits the use of economic statecraft
(Skalnes, 2000; Davis, 2008/9). During the Cold War, the sanctions regime in the West to restrict exports
to Soviet bloc countries (CoCoM) faced ongoing resistance from firms eager to trade more freely. Even
when retaliation occurs in the context of WTO-authorized enforcement against a violation by a trade
partner, the decision to raise tariffs encounters opposition from home industries that would suffer from
the actions.22 As the United States and European governments debate sanctions against Russia for its
21 See Martin (1992), Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott (1990) and Drezner (2003) on sanctions literature. Gartzke, Li and
Boehmer (2001) model the signaling value of economic harm as the mechanism behind the commercial peace.
22 Andersen and Blanchet (2010, p. 237) describe how such petitions from business prevented the use of the carousel
retaliation plan devised by Congress to increase the pain of retaliation against Europe in two well known disputes (hormones
and bananas). Europe encountered similar difficulties when trying to draft a list for retaliation against the United States in the
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actions in Ukraine in 2014, the harm to business interests looms as a major concern.23
State control over economic activities in a sector addresses this problem by lowering domestic op-
position to letting foreign policy influence business decisions. Close integration with the state in terms
of personnel, funding, and goals, hard-wires business actors to support state preferences. Market com-
petition pushes for decisions on a commercial basis, but state intervention introduces additional decision
criteria that call on economic actors to incorporate non-commercial goals.
Indeed, WTO rules reflect this tendency, admonishing that state-trading enterprises must make pur-
chases “solely in accordance with commercial considerations.”24 While the manipulation of economic
policies to serve political interests clearly challenges the non-discrimination rules of the WTO, the ex-
plicit statement highlights that state-controlled enterprises are most subject to interference and in need
of monitoring. Yet precisely because of the close relationship between firm and state, there may be no
paper trail of discriminatory policies that could be challenged in the WTO.
3.1 State Ownership and Trade
Governments have a number of tools at their disposal to influence the behavior of firms. They may selec-
tively enforce regulations or tax collection, dictate access to financing from state-backed institutions, or
support purchases through government procurement. In this paper, we focus on state ownership of firms
as the most direct and observable form of control.
How does state ownership facilitate the politicization of trade? Most fundamentally, the purpose of
state-owned enterprises is to advance the goals of the state. While SOEs can and increasingly do operate
steel safeguard dispute (Nordstrom, 2010, p. 268).
23 Alison Smale and Danny Hakim, “European Firms Seek to Minimize Russia Sanctions,” New York Times, April 26,
2014.
24 Article XVII of the General Agreement, full text available at the WTO website: http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf.
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with commercial considerations, they serve primarily as conduits through which the government may
intervene in the economy to serve particular social, economic, or political objectives deemed necessary
for the national interest.25 In China, for example, many SOEs are required to maintain burdensome
employment levels and forced to manage resource-depleting social ventures, like schools and hospitals,
under their corporate umbrellas to serve the government’s goals of mitigating social unrest (Steinfeld,
2000). In India, the state-owned Food Corporation of India (FCI) was established in 1965 to ensure
effective price supports for farmers, distribute food grains under the country’s Public Distribution Sys-
tem, and maintain stocks to ensure national food security. The original purpose behind the formation of
Hindustan Latex in 1969 (now HLL Lifecare), one of India’s largest condom producers, was to promote
the government’s population control policies.26 While state-owned companies also compete for revenues
and market share, and while profits are sometimes used as a measure of firm performance, they are not
solely focused on the pursuit of profits. Top managers at SOEs ultimately face evaluation not just by
public shareholders or corporate trustees, but by political officials who assess them in large part on how
successfully they have implemented government objectives. Given that fulfilling political imperatives is
one of the primary raisons d’eˆtre of these firms, we should expect them to pose less resistance to political
demands than private firms in general.
At the same time, the close relationship between the state leadership and state-owned firms low-
ers opposition to political maneuvering. In China, two central organizations—the Central Organization
Department (COD), the head of which is a member of the Politburo, and the State-owned Assets Super-
25 For example, the Indian government describes the role of state-owned enterprises (known as “public sector undertakings”
(PSUs)) on its official portal as the following: “PSUs provide leverage to the Government (their controlling shareholder) to
intervene in the economy directly or indirectly to achieve the desired socio-economic objectives and maximize long-term
goals.” See http://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/spotlight_archive.php?id=78; accessed August 20,
2012.
26 Today FCI continues its original missions, while HLL Lifecare is tasked with aiding the government’s disease control
efforts. “Stakes and Mistakes: India Is Privatising Companies for the Wrong Reasons,” The Economist, November 12, 2009.
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vision and Administration Commission (SASAC), with the approval of the COD—have the authority to
appoint the leadership of the country’s 117 remaining centrally-owned SOEs.27 In India, the responsibil-
ity for managing SOEs falls with the relevant ministries, determined by industry, and the Department of
Public Undertakings. The ministers responsible for these agencies report directly to parliament, and de-
cisions over how SOEs should serve national economic policy fall to the legislature and executive, which
allows the government to influence their direction and operation.28 By consolidating the management
of SOEs under central-government authority and directly appointing corporate leadership in some cases,
the government exercises a great amount of control over the decisions and operations of state-owned
firms.
When top managers of major SOEs are determined by political appointment, the lines between busi-
ness and politics blur, and business leaders are incentivized to serve the demands of the state. The
appointees themselves are often political insiders. A study by Pei (2006) shows that the three top lead-
ership positions—CEO, Chairman and Party Secretary—in almost all centrally-managed Chinese SOEs
are occupied by senior members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In a number of cases, the
CEO and Party Secretary are the same person. Business managers in state-owned enterprises thus of-
ten view their responsibilities as two-fold—to advance the interests of the firm and the state—and may
suffer consequences for failing to do so. In one prominent example, Roger Agnelli, the former head of
Brazilian state-owned mining giant Vale, was ousted by President Dilma Rousseff in 2012 for being too
“independent-minded” and failing to follow the government’s development agenda.29 On the flip side,
it has been observed at the meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos that contrary to Western
27 In 2003, the government established the SASAC under which the monitoring and management of SOEs, previously
separated across several ministries and agencies, was consolidated. The SASAC falls directly under the authority of the State
Council of the National People’s Congress, the country’s chief administrative authority.
28 Within parliament the 22-member Committee on Public Undertakings is tasked with reviewing the reports of the relevant
administrative bodies and is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the management of SOEs more directly.
29 “The Visible Hand,” The Economist, January 21, 2012.
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delegations, “Chinese delegates from both [government and business] tend to have the same point of
view, and even the same patriotic talking-points.”30
In addition to influence through corporate governance, financial support provides leverage over SOEs.
These firms do not, and in many cases could not, operate without the financial sponsorship of the state.
Much scholarly and policy research has documented the inefficiencies of state-backed firms, especially
relative to private firms (e.g. Alchian, 1965; Boardman and Vining, 1989, 1992; World Bank, 1995). In
India, the government recently approved an expensive bailout plan for 46 centrally-owned SOEs it deems
“sick” (severely underperforming), which account for about 20 percent of all centrally-owned SOEs.31
Those state-owned firms able to achieve competitiveness owe much of their success to privileged access
to capital and other regulatory benefits. SOEs enjoy a range of advantages over private firms, including
favorable taxation, subsidies, and preferential financing (Capobianco and Christiansen, 2011; DeWenter
and Malatesta, 2001). In China, over 75 percent of the country’s capital, which is largely provided by
state-owned banks, flows to SOEs.32 For these firms, refusing to comply with political demands could
mean a reduction in financial benefits.
The interactions between SOEs and policymakers represent mutual dependence. Just as the bu-
reaucratic channels linking SOEs directly to the state enhance government oversight, they also provide
avenues for managers to bargain for compensation when state policy adversely impacts firm profits or
operations. Indeed, state-owned firms report higher levels of policy influence than private firms (Aisbett
and McAusland, 2013).33 Thus given their subsidized operations and ability to negotiate for compen-
30 “The Rise of State Capitalism,” The Economist, January 21, 2012.
31 Purba Das, “Rs 40,650 cr for sick PSUs,” The Sunday Guardian, August 19, 2012.
32 John Lee, “China’s Corporate Leninism,” The American Standard, May/June 2012.
33 Baccini and Malesky (2012) show that SOEs in Vietnam experienced the smallest tariff reductions and longest transition
periods following WTO accession, which the authors attribute to SOE lobbying. It is important not to overstate this influence,
which may be weakest when SOE preferences diverge from those of policymakers (Aisbett and McAusland, 2013). Moreover,
autonomy over corporate decision-making can reinforce dependence on the state when easy access to credit allows for rapid
17
sation, SOEs are less sensitive than non-SOEs to distributional costs arising from the manipulation of
economic policies. They have less need to object to state influence that injects non-commercial criteria
for business. Instead, dependence on the state requires responsiveness to government requests.
We hypothesize that economic statecraft is contingent on government capacity to control economic
actors. Completely free markets are unlikely to show any correlation between political relations and
trade. In free-market economies, states must adopt explicit policies to constrain markets, such as impos-
ing legal restrictions on trade to force compliance by private actors. In contrast, where the state maintains
more control over firms, politicizing trade can be a quick and informal process. For the reasons outlined
above, firms owned by the state are the most likely to be responsive to government preferences. Looking
within China and India, we expect to observe a stronger correlation between political relations and trade
in the state-owned sector of the economy compared to the private sector.
4 Measuring State Control and Political Relations
4.1 Trade by Enterprise Ownership Type
To analyze the effect of political relations on import and export flows as a function of state control
over economic activity, we differentiate between the trading activities of the state-controlled and private
sectors of the economy.
For our analysis of Chinese trade, we obtained data on trade by enterprise ownership type from
the Customs Bureau through Customs Info, a government-owned company licensed to distribute official
customs data.34 The data include the annual value of bilateral imports and exports by ownership category.
and imprudent expansion (Steinfeld, 2000; Su, 2013).
34 http://www.customs-info.com/
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In all, there are nine ownership categories covering government, private, and foreign enterprises, as well
as various forms of hybrid ownership.35 For our purposes, the relevant categories are private enterprises
and SOEs. SOEs are defined as enterprises in which the government holds the majority equity share and
include both centrally- and locally-owned enterprises. We are thus able to measure the value of trade in
each year flowing to and from a partner country through state-owned firms versus private firms.
For India, we use Prowess firm-level data from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, an
Indian think-tank, and trade data from UN Comtrade.36 The Prowess database includes data on total
assets, sector, and ownership type for 27,000 companies, which together comprise 75 percent of all
corporate tax revenue. We define as SOEs those enterprises categorized as “Central Government,” “State
Government,” or “Central and State Government” in Prowess.37 Unfortunately, statistics on bilateral
trade by firm ownership type are not available in Prowess. We therefore construct variables that proxy
for trade through state-owned and private enterprises using the following procedure: we first calculate the
share of assets held by SOEs in each sector; we then multiply the sector share by the volume of imports
or exports for the sector (from Comtrade) for a particular bilateral trade relationship; finally, we sum the
resulting values across sectors to get an estimate of the annual volume of imports and exports flowing
through SOEs for the dyad. We repeat the procedure for each partner country. Private-enterprise trade is
calculated by the same method.38 Our procedure assumes that SOE shares in total assets are equivalent
35 The categories are as follows: state-owned enterprise, sino-foreign contractual joint venture, sino-foreign equity joint
venture, foreign-owned enterprise, collective enterprise, private enterprise, privately or individually-owned business, enter-
prise with customs declaration authority but without permission to import or export, and “other.” Importantly, just because an
enterprise is categorized as “private” does not mean that the government is not a minority shareholder; local governments in
particular often own shares of local firms.
36 Trade data are from UN Comtrade accessed by using the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software
(http://wits.worldbank.org; accessed 28 October 2013.) The data are classified according to the third revision of
the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC). For details on the Prowess database,
see http://prowess.cmie.com/; accessed April/May 2012 and November 2013.
37 We also include in this category enterprises classified as “State and Private Sector” and “Joint Enterprises,” a class of
enterprises in which the state is typically the majority shareholder.
38 The following example illustrates how we construct our measure of trade by firm ownership type for India. Consider
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to SOE shares in trade, which is unlikely to be true in reality. The potential for over- or under-estimating
trade, however, will not affect our estimation results as long as there are not systematic differences across
trade partners.
Figure 2 demonstrates the contribution of SOEs and private enterprises to Chinese and Indian imports
and exports over the sample period. The share of China’s trade comprised by SOEs has fallen over the
last decade during the period of privatization, while the share of trade comprised by the private sector has
risen correspondingly. The decline in SOE shares of trade has leveled off recently, and SOEs continue to
comprise large shares of China’s overall trade—about 30 percent of imports and 12 percent of exports.
India presents a different pattern. Estimated trade shares remain generally even over time, especially
since 2000, with SOE trade again comprising smaller shares of total imports and exports than private
enterprises but still notable shares overall—about 40 percent of imports and 15 percent of exports.40
One challenge to making inferences about state ownership is the strategic nature of government
decisions that determine state ownership; SOE intensity is not randomly allocated across sectors. Energy
and resource sectors experience the highest levels of state ownership because of their importance to both
economic growth and security. The decisions about ownership reflect state priorities toward the sector
in general. This mitigates the endogeneity problem for our research question because we leverage the
variation in political relations with specific trading partners that is largely independent of ownership
decisions across different sectors of the economy.
exports from India to Poland. In the year 2000, India exported 806,345 US$ worth of electrical machinery and apparatus to
Poland (ISIC Rev.3, division 31). In this sector and year, SOEs held 15.7 percent and private enterprises held 67.3 percent
of total assets.39 Multiplying the trade values by the asset shares, we estimate that 126,450 US$ worth of exports exited
through SOEs and 542,983 US$ through private enterprises. We repeat this procedure for all ISIC divisions covered in the
trade data and sum across sectors to obtain values for SOE and private enterprise trade. According to the resulting estimates,
SOE exports from India to Poland amounted to 8.6 million US$, compared to 65.4 million US$ through private enterprises.
We repeat the procedure for each partner country/year. By using a high level of sector aggregation (ISIC Rev.3 2-digit), the
measure accounts for the entire length of the intra-industry vertical production chain. Our analysis thus captures cases in
which political disputes affect upstream trade in inputs.
40 SOE and private-sector shares do not necessarily sum to 100; the remaining shares are comprised by other types of
enterprises, such as foreign, joint-venture, and collective.
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Figure 2: Trade by Enterprise Ownership Type: Imports and exports of SOEs and private enterprises as
a share of total imports and exports (1991-2012; data for China begin in 1993).
4.2 Political Relations
While bilateral trade is objectively quantifiable, political relations between countries are difficult to mea-
sure. Our analysis relies on several variables that capture different aspects of relations. We include in-
dicators common in the literature—negative political events and voting alignment in the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA)—for both China and India, as well as a unique “China-specific” measure.
Our first two measures quantify the tensions that occur between China, India, and their trading part-
ners using political events data. More precisely, we use the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone
(GDELT) events data from Leetaru and Schrodt (2013). The dataset, considered the most comprehen-
sive of its kind, uses the TABARI coding system to classify daily reports of events from eleven global
news outlets into categories based on the actors involved in the event (i.e. government, military, citizens,
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etc.).41 Each event is weighted by the corresponding “Goldstein score,” a value between -10 and 10 that
captures the likelihood that the event will impact on the stability of the country, based on its type. For
example, a use of military force would be weighted more heavily than an expulsion of another coun-
try’s diplomats, but expelling diplomats would be weighted more heavily than a verbal condemnation of
another country’s actions.42 We then sum the severity-weighted number of negative events to create a
single annual observation and take the log to smooth the distribution. Our first indicator captures events
involving a government (non-military) actor, while the second captures events involving a military actor
to determine whether militarized disputes provoke a stronger reaction than diplomatic events.
Figure 3 plots the logged number of negative events that occurred after 1990 between China (first and
third panel) and India (second and fourth panel) with three major partners – the United States (left), Japan
(center) and Russia (right). Several events that have caused bilateral tensions with China are visible in the
data. For example, the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the Hainan Island incident,
during which the Chinese government detained the crew of a US Navy Intelligence plane following a
mid-air collision with a PRC Navy interception fighter jet, are reflected in the spikes in negative events
in 1999 and 2001 respectively. Similarly, the Japanese government’s 2010 detention of a Chinese fishing
vessel and its captain near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands mentioned in section 1.2 is reflected in
the military events data.43 Turning to India, the spikes in both government and military tensions with the
US in 1998, for example, correspond to the events surrounding India’s nuclear weapon tests in Pokhran.
Our third relations variable measures the degree of distance in foreign policy orientation between
41 TABARI (Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions) is a system for the machine coding of event data
based on pattern recognition. It has been found to be as accurate as human coders. See, for example, Best, Carpino and
Crescenzi (2013).
42 For further explanation of the Goldstein scale, see Goldstein (1992).
43 While the Japanese government does not consider the Coast Guard boats that engaged in action in this case to be part
of the military, it seems that GDELT codes such actions as military disputes. Note that the United States and some other
countries do integrate their Coast Guard as part of military.
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China or India and each partner country. Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) use UNGA voting data
to construct an annual measure of each country’s ideal point along a single dimension that captures
its position vis-a`-vis a “US-led liberal order.” The resulting scores are differenced to obtain dyadic
measures of the distance between a pair of states in terms of their foreign policy preferences. The
measure improves upon traditional UN voting alignment measures in at least two ways. First, it uses
resolutions that were identical over time to “bridge observations,” allowing researchers to separate out
shifts in state preferences from changes in the UN agenda and make more meaningful comparisons of
state preferences over time. Second, measuring the gap in preferences between pairs of states by the
difference in their ideal points rather than by the difference in their voting records helps to eliminate
noise and facilitate better comparisons of states’ relative foreign policy orientations.
Figure 3 plots the ideal point distances between China (fifth panel) and India (sixth panel) and the US,
Japan, and Russia. Interestingly, the patterns are similar for China and India for each partner country,
but as the plots demonstrate, ideal-point distances vary across countries and over time. For example,
while the distances between China and the US and China and Japan remained relatively stable from the
mid-1990s through 2010, India bridged some of its distance with these countries between the mid-1990s
and early 2000s. The plots also accurately reflect the closer alignment of both China and India with
Russia after the end of the Cold War. By 2010, both countries were closer to Russia than to either the
US or Japan.
For our China analysis, we employ an additional measure that captures the overall level of relations
between China and twelve states from a Chinese perspective. 44 Developed by Chinese scholar Yan
Xuetong and colleagues, this conflict-cooperation index is based on reports of bilateral political events
44 The twelve countries included in the data are Australia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, US, UK, and Vietnam.
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from Chinese newspapers (Yan, 2010).45 Events—both positive and negative—are tallied on a monthly
basis and weighted by severity in similar fashion to the Goldstein scores explained above. The resulting
values are then summed to form positive and negative index scores, which are weighted by the overall
level of relations from the previous month and summed again to obtain the change in relations from
the previous month. The rationale behind this weighting scheme is that the effect of events should
be conditional on the existing level of relations. For example, a verbal criticism probably affects the
overall level of relations less between two countries already at war than between two countries with
cooperative relations. The change from the previous month is added to the previous month’s overall
relations score to form the new overall relations score. The final relations score is bounded between -9
and 9. Figure 3 demonstrates that the Yan score captures Sino-Japanese tensions that arose from disputes
over war history in the middle of the 2000s and shows deterioration in 2011 of the bilateral climate
after the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute in late 2010. In line with the evolution of Sino-Russian voting
alignment in the UNGA, the score on relations with Russia shows strongly improving relations with
China after the end of the Cold War.
Table 1 compares the measures of political relations by ranking the states with the most negative
relationships. According to the average score on Yan’s scale, where higher values indicate better rela-
tions, of the twelve countries covered, China’s relations are worst with the United States (0.4), a position
which extends across each of the other three measures. 46 Taiwan occupies the second spot for China
in terms of both negative government events and military events but fails to appear in UNGA voting or
the Yan Index because it is not recognized as a sovereign country in either context. Japan, South Korea,
and Russia feature prominently on both events lists for China, while Pakistan, the US, Sri Lanka and
45 We are grateful to Yan Xuetong for generously sharing an updated version of the dataset and to Qi Haixia for answering
our questions about the data.
46 See Yan and Qi (2012) for a more complete discussion of the state of US-China relations.
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China are among the countries that experienced the most negative events with India. Not surprisingly,
the countries that experience the fewest events with either China or India are small, geographically dis-
tant countries that would be unlikely to have strong engagement with either country diplomatically or
militarily. Thirty-nine countries were engaged in no goverment or miltary events with China over the
sample period, and ninety-seven did not experience any events with India. Moving to UNGA voting, the
patterns for China and India are quite similar; the same ten coutries comprise the list for both countries
with slight differences in order. After the US, the countries with which both China and India are most
distant are Israel (average score of 3.1 for China and 3.0 for India) and the UK (2.6 for China and 2.5 for
India). On the flip side, China is most closely aligned with Pakistan (.20) and Nigeria (.22), while India
is closest to East Timor (.19), Uganda (.19), and Ghana (.19).
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Figure 3: Diplomatic Tensions: Measures of political relations (1990-2011).
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5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Empirical Strategy
To test our hypothesis, we build on the gravity model of trade, the “workhorse” of the empirical trade
literature (e.g. Tinbergen, 1962; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). According to this model, trade
flows are expected to increase with both the exporter’s supply and the importer’s demand of goods and to
decrease with trade costs. While supply and demand are usually proxied by exporter and importer GDP,
respectively, geographic distance is commonly used as a proxy for trade costs, and additional variables,
such as common language, measure friction. We model bilateral trade flows controlled by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and those controlled by private enterprises using seemingly unrelated estimations.47
Specifically, we estimate the following system of equations:
tradeSOE, ij = β0 + β1relationsijt + β2GDP ijt + β3X ijt + νj + τt + εijt (1)
tradeprivate,ij = β˜0 + β˜1relationsijt + β˜2GDP ijt + β˜3X ijt + ν˜j + τ˜t + ε˜ijt (2)
where tradeSOE represents (logged) import or export flows between country i (China or India) and its
trading partner j that are under the control of SOEs, tradeprivate represents the corresponding (logged)
import or export flows between country i (China or India) and its trading partner j through private
enterprises, relations represents each of our four measures of political relations, GDP denotes the product
of exporter and importer GDP in constant 2005 US$, X represents a vector of control variables, ν
represents a set of partner-country dummies, τ represents a set of year dummies, and ε is the error
47 We use the STATA command “suest” to combine estimation results.
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term.48 Standard errors are clustered on partner country. We run each system of equations separately
for import and export flows to allow political relations to impact on imports and exports differently. To
test our hypothesis, we include each measure of relations separately. All measures are logged with the
exception of the Yan index.
Note that our specification is identical to an estimation of OLS equation-by-equation since both
equations use the same set of regressors. Seemingly unrelated estimations enable us to test hypotheses
involving parameters in both equations. Specifically, we test whether the coefficients on our political
relations variables differ between SOE and private-enterprise trade. We expect to find that political rela-
tions play a larger role in trade controlled by SOEs than in trade controlled by private enterprises. For our
first three measures of relations—negative government events, negative military events, and UNGA ideal
point distance—where larger values correspond with more negative relations, our formal expectation is
β1 < β˜1. For the Yan measure, where larger values correspond with more positive relations, we expect
β1 > β˜1.
We include GDP from the standard gravity model. Data are from World Development Indicators
(WDI). Because we employ partner-country fixed effects, however, we leave out of our model geo-
graphic distance and other time-invariant determinants of bilateral trade flows.49 Within our set of con-
trol variables X, we first include market potential, which we proxy as the (logged) product of exporter
and importer population size, with data from WDI. We also include two control variables for political
institutions at the domestic and international level. Because trade relations have been found to depend on
regime type (see, for example, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2000; Aidt and Gassebner, 2010), we
48 All trade values are converted to constant 2005 US$ using US consumer price indices obtained from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators database available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013.
49 The interested reader will find regression results without partner-country fixed effects below in the subsection on robust-
ness checks.
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control for differences in the trade policies of democratic versus authoritarian regimes with the polity2
variable from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013). Polity is a 21-point index, where
the largest value refers to a fully institutionalized democracy. Next we add a dummy variable that cap-
tures participation in the WTO; the variable takes a value of 1 if both countries are members of the WTO
for the majority of a given year; data are from the WTO website.
Finally, to mitigate endogeneity concerns, we lag all covariates by one year. Our analysis for China
starts in 1993, the first year for which Customs Info provides data by ownership type, and the analysis
for India begins in 1991 when the country entered its period of economic liberalization. All estimations
extend through 2012. Table 5 in the appendix lists all variables, their definitions, and their sources.
Descriptive statistics are found in Table 6.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Trade with China
Table 2 presents our results for imports to China. Each column shows the results for one of our four
measures of political relations. While the upper half of the table displays the results for SOE trade, the
lower half shows the corresponding results for private-enterprise trade.
Beginning with column 1, the coefficient for the index of negative government events between China
and its trade partner has the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the one-percent
level in the SOE equation, while there is no significant effect on private-enterprise trade. A Wald test
(shown in last row of Table 2) shows that the observed differences in the coefficients are statistically
significant at the one-percent level. The results of this first equation support our hypothesis that the
effect of bilateral relations on trade is stronger in the state-controlled sector of the economy. Moreover,
the effects are large; a one-percent increase in our government events index decreases SOE imports by
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imports Imports Imports Imports
Negative events Negative events UNGA voting Yan index
(government) (military) (ideal point distance)
SOE trade
Political relations -0.1206*** -0.1543*** -0.4289*** 0.0585**
(0.0402) (0.0361) (0.1094) (0.0290)
(log) GDP 1.6039* 1.6236* 1.2110 0.5319
(0.8382) (0.8453) (0.8751) (0.5566)
(log) Population 4.9985** 4.8963** 4.6166** 3.2498**
(2.0463) (2.0415) (1.9522) (1.5526)
Both in WTO 0.7498 0.7771 0.7056 -0.3265**
(0.5944) (0.5930) (0.6212) (0.1500)
Polity 0.0310 0.0324 0.0498 -0.0030
(0.0543) (0.0543) (0.0553) (0.0236)
Private enterprise trade
Political relations 0.0583 -0.1265 -0.1098 0.1150
(0.0578) (0.0946) (0.1351) (0.2058)
(log) GDP 2.0813** 2.0514** 2.3472** -0.3436
(1.0246) (1.0264) (1.1215) (2.9933)
(log) Population 3.5546** 3.5434** 3.2008* 45.2565***
(1.7649) (1.7482) (1.7163) (5.7960)
Both in WTO 0.8177 0.8022 1.2351 -3.1196***
(1.1213) (1.1192) (1.1510) (0.7269)
Polity -0.0528 -0.0561 -0.0619 -0.3100***
(0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0576) (0.0746)
Number of observations 2984 2984 2954 240
Wald test (p-value) 0.005 0.757 0.033 0.778
Table 2: Imports to China (1993-2012): Results of a gravity model estimating the (logged) import value
between China and its trading partners with partner-country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered on partner country. Regressions for SOE and private-sector trade are run as seemingly unrelated
estimations. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
0.12 percent. To give a substantive example of this result, the decline in China’s relations with Japan
in 2010, resulting from Japan’s retention of a Chinese fishing vessel near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands,
among other tensions, and registered as an increase in negative events by 218 percent, corresponds to a
26.5 percent drop in SOE imports from Japan between 2010 and 2011, all else equal.
In column 2, we see that negative military events produce similar negative and significant effects
on SOE imports. A one-percent increase in military events decreases SOE imports by 0.15 percent
respectively. Moving to private-enterprise imports, we again find that the coefficient on negative events
is less negative than for SOE trade and fails to reach significance at conventional levels. However, unlike
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with government events, the results of the corresponding Wald test do not show a significant difference
between SOEs and private enterprises. Turning to our measure of political relations based on UN voting
(column 3), we again find that the effect on import flows is limited to SOEs and that the difference
between state and private enterprises is statistically significant at conventional levels, as shown by the
Wald test. A one-percent increase in the ideal point distance between China and a given trade partner
reduces SOE imports by 0.43 percent. With respect to the Yan index (column 4), we also find only
a statistically significant effect of political relations on imports through SOEs, but the corresponding
Wald test does not suggest a significant difference between state-owned and private enterprises. While
the index is comprehensive in its treatment of political relations across multiple dimensions, it has the
drawback that it covers only twelve countries. Taken together, we find statistically significant effects of
political tensions only on SOE imports. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that the effect of
diplomatic tensions on imports is more pronounced in the state-owned sector of the economy.
Turning the results for our control variables in models with large samples (columns 1-3), a partner’s
population size is positive and significant at the five-percent level in all equations, except for UN voting
for private enterprises, where it is significant at the ten-percent level. Partner-country GDP is a robust
predictor of trade through private enterprises. Our measures of political and trade institutions, polity and
WTO membership, do not achieve statistical significance at conventional levels in any of the models.
The control variables have different effects in column 4, which may simply reflect the limited sample of
twelve partner countries. While population is still highly significant for both SOE and private enterprise
imports, GDP fails to reach significance in either group. At the same time, WTO membership has
a negative coefficient for both SOE and private imports, significant at the five- and one-percent level
respectively, and the coefficient on polity is negative and highly significant for private enterprises.50
50 These results from a fixed-effects regression should not be interpreted as evidence that WTO membership and democ-
racy harm overall trade with China. The results from simple OLS regressions in Table 7 suggest instead that joint WTO
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Next we examine China’s exports. Table 3 presents our results for each of our four measures of
political relations. Beginning with column 1, we do not see a significant effect of government events
on either SOE or private-enterprise exports. Splitting out just military events, however, does produce
a negative and highly significant effect on both SOE and private exports (column 2). It seems that
the bar is higher for exports than imports in terms of the severity of events that would be expected
provoke a trade response, likely because cutting exports hurts the exporting country as well as the partner
country. Interestingly, the effect is larger for private enterprises, as confirmed by the Wald test. A
possible explanation is that the Chinese government maintains leverage over private enterprises as well
as SOEs. The private sector in China is very much intertwined with the government. In this regard,
several studies have analyzed the role of affiliation with the China Communist Party for private business
activities (e.g. Li et al., 2008; Lu, 2011). Returning to our salmon case from section 2 as an example, two
of the strongest sources of state influence in the fishing sector are found in the subsidies the government
provides to private fishing enterprises, without which most would not survive, and its integration of the
entire fishing fleet into a large maritime militia upon which it calls to shore up maritime security.51 Even
private fishermen are thus routinely mobilized in the service of political goals. Policy distance also has a
negative effect on both SOE and private-enterprise exports, significant at the ten-percent and five-percent
levels respectively. Again contrary to our hypothesis, the coefficient on private-enterprises is larger than
the coefficient on SOEs, and the difference is statistically significant as confirmed by the Wald test.
Overall, the results for China do not support the hypothesis that political relations have a larger effect on
state-controlled trade for exports, while they strongly support our hypothesis for imports.
membership increases, not decreases, Chinese imports and show negative effects of democratic institutions only for SOE
trade.
51 See Lyle Goldstein, “China’s fishing fleet sets challenge to US,” Asia Times, August 7, 2009.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports Exports Exports Exports
Negative events Negative events UNGA voting Yan index
(government) (military) (ideal point distance)
SOE trade
Political relations -0.0107 -0.0351*** -0.0436* 0.0515**
(0.0072) (0.0108) (0.0241) (0.0239)
(log) GDP 1.0142*** 1.0137*** 1.0608*** 2.0270***
(0.2186) (0.2167) (0.2323) (0.3544)
(log) Population 0.1851 0.1696 0.0768 0.6252
(0.4332) (0.4295) (0.4256) (1.1190)
Both in WTO -0.3820** -0.3798** -0.3398* 0.1111
(0.1801) (0.1794) (0.1843) (0.1458)
Polity 0.0113 0.0111 0.0108 0.0066
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0051)
Private enterprise trade
Political relations -0.0381 -0.1849** -0.2448** 0.4183
(0.0504) (0.0817) (0.1140) (0.3845)
(log) GDP 2.1312*** 2.1236*** 2.7202*** 3.9574
(0.7683) (0.7665) (0.7381) (5.6769)
(log) Population 1.2363 1.1631 0.6735 4.3790
(2.0194) (1.9901) (1.9231) (7.5724)
Both in WTO -2.4331*** -2.4260*** -2.3629*** -4.0361*
(0.4900) (0.4911) (0.4846) (2.4357)
Polity 0.0969* 0.0956* 0.1010** -0.0368
(0.0535) (0.0526) (0.0506) (0.0307)
Number of observations 2984 2984 2954 240
Wald test (p-value) 0.578 0.053 0.061 0.332
Table 3: Exports from China (1993-2012): Results of a gravity model estimating the (logged) export
value between China and its trading partners with partner-country and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered on partner country. Regressions for SOE and private-sector trade are run as seemingly
unrelated estimations. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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5.2.2 Trade with India
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 present our results for Indian imports. We find a negative relationship between
events and imports for both SOE and private-enterprise trade with respect to both government events
(column 1) and military events (column 2). The coefficients on both SOE and private-enterprise imports
are statistically significant at the one-percent level in both models, but the Wald tests show a statistically
larger effect on SOEs only for military events. Moreover, the coefficients are large. A one-percent
increase in negative government events produces a 0.41 percent decrease in imports for SOEs, while
the comparable effect for negative military events is 0.54 percent. Turning to ideal point distance, we
again observe a negative effect of political relations, but the effect is significant only for SOEs at the
five-percent level. The Wald test shows that the difference in the coefficients is statistically significant at
the five-percent level. On the whole, the findings support our hypothesis.
Turning to the control variables, the effect of GDP is large, postive, and significant at least at the
five-percent level in all models for both SOEs and private enterprises. The effect of population is also
positive in all models but only achieves significance for SOEs and only at the ten-percent level. The
coefficients on WTO and polity are positive across all models for both SOEs and private enterprises but
never achieves statistical significance at conventional levels.52
52 These results from a fixed-effects regression do not necessarily suggest that WTO membership and democratic institu-
tions do not play a role for trade with India. As can be seen from the simple OLS results presented in Table 9, Indian private
companies import more from WTO members.
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Lastly, we analyze the role of political relations for Indian exports in columns 4-6. In general, we find
support for the hypothesis that negative political events harm exports; the coefficients on both measures
of events are negative for both SOEs and private enterprises and statistically significant at the one-percent
level (columns 4 and 5). The Wald test indicates a significantly larger trade response to military tensions
in the state-owned sector. This effect does not extend to ideal point distance, however (column 6). The
coefficient on ideal point distance is negative, as expected, but never achieves significance for either
SOEs or private enterprises. Overall, the coefficients on political relations for exports are much smaller
than for imports. In sum, political relations affect India’s trading patterns; the effect is more pronounced
for SOEs than for private enterprises and stronger for imports.
5.2.3 Tests for Robustness
Several additional tests demonstrate the robustness of our results to alternative sample specification. The
results demonstrating the impact of our relations variables on imports are generally robust to the removal
of any particular year. For imports analysis there are two exceptions: our findings for impact of UN
ideal point distance on Chinese imports are sensitive to the removal of 1995 (the Wald test does not show
a significant difference between SOE versus private enterprises at conventional levels of significance);
similarly, the impact of ideal point distance on Indian imports falls below conventional levels of signif-
icance if we remove 1994 or 1999 (p-values: 0.11 and 0.13). In all other cases, the qualitative results
for imports remain unchanged. While the findings for Indian exports are robust to the removal of any
particular year, the export analysis for China is more sensitive—three years appear to be important for
the surprising finding for China that private sector exports declined more in response to military events
than SOE exports—the removal of 1994, 1995, or 2012, erases the significance of the difference between
state-owned and private enterprises in the effect of military events on Chinese exports.
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Next, we tested whether our findings are driven by single countries. Removing the US, Japan, and
Pakistan—countries with which China and/or India experience a large number of political events—as
trade partners does not qualitatively change the results on Chinese and Indian imports, nor does removing
any other single trade partner. Again, the export findings appear to be a bit weaker.53 Full regression
results are available upon request.
Finally, we also run standard gravity models without partner-country fixed effects to see whether our
results hold when we analyze both the within and between variations rather than the within variation
only. In these specifications, we can add (logged) bilateral distance defined as the great-circle distance
between the 25 major cities of each country, weighted by the share of each city in the country’s overall
population. We also include a dummy for contiguity and a variable that takes a value of 1 if at least
nine percent of the population of both countries share a common language, as both common border
and common language are expected to facilitate trade. Being landlocked, on the other hand, should
increase trade costs and reduce bilateral trade; we thus include a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the
trade partner has no access to the sea. All four variables are obtained from the GeoDist dataset of the
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Finally,
to address the argument that structural patterns of trade follow alliance blocs (Gowa, 1994), we add a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a trading partner is an ally of the United States in a particular
year. Given that India does not have any formal alliances of its own, and China has few, the measure of
US alignment offers a better indicator of states that might generate security externalities and therefore
reductions in trade.54
53 The Wald tests loses statistical significance for military events twice in the Indian case (Cape Verde and Qatar, both
p-values, 0.16) and once in the Chinese case (Australia, 0.11). The same holds once for UNGA voting and Chinese exports
(Indonesia, 0.11). No qualitative changes in all other cases.
54 Data are obtained from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project (Leeds et al., 2002). Because
these data end in 2003, we carry forward the 2003 value to the end of our dataset under the assumption that a country’s
alliance portfolio does not vary much over time.
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Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9 show the results of the regressions excluding partner-country fixed
effects. Overall, the results are similar to the ones obtained using the stricter fixed-effects specifications.
In most models, we find the effect of bilateral tensions on Chinese or Indian imports to be significantly
more negative in the state-controlled sector of the economy compared to the private sector. Consistent
with our previous findings, Chinese exports appear again to be the outlier with our findings hinting in the
opposite direction.
6 Conclusion
Does globalization render economic statecraft obsolete? Our research suggests that the answer is no.
Governments still aspire to use economic tools to influence international politics. Deregulation of mar-
kets, transnational production, and international trade rules have simply narrowed their capacity for
action. We trace politicization of trade directly to the role of government in the economy. The liter-
ature on interdependence, which aggregates the incentives of private actors and state intervention, has
been unable to explain how the linkage between trade and foreign policy arises. In contrast, we identify
state control as the mechanism to explain why trade patterns correlate with political relations and bring
original data to test the relationship.
Where governments maintain control over trade flows, trade continues to follow the flag. We argue
that this is most likely to occur when the government holds an ownership stake in firms that allows
influence over their operations. We show that negative events with a trade partner reduce imports by
China and India respectively, and that the magnitude of the change is greatest in the state-controlled
sector of the economy. More general indicators of political “closeness” between states, as measured by
their UNGA voting patterns, show a similar pattern. The results for exports are much weaker and we
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were only able to confirm our findings for India. By showing that the relationship between foreign policy
and trade is conditional on state control, our study points to a new area for attention in the debate about
economic interdependence and cooperation.
The paper also addresses the political economy of state ownership. It is not surprising that state
control over economic actors would shift their behavior. Yet the literature has paid insufficient attention
to how state interests shape trade patterns as a function of state control. Even as market-based economic
policies are the norm, many states continue to exercise control over selected sectors. With China’s
emergence as the world’s second largest economy, state influence over economic actors becomes an even
more important avenue of inquiry. Importantly, however, our findings also extend to India, suggesting
that the phenomenon is not “China-specific” nor driven by regime type. Our research highlights one
important dimension of this influence for international relations research: since state-owned firms make
decisions based on political rather than commercial interests, states can manipulate trade in pursuit of
foreign policy goals.
Future research should address the effectiveness of these strategies. From both theoretical and policy
perspectives, it is important to know whether states modify their behavior to avoid negative effects on
trade flows. At the same time, such strategic anticipation has been a central problem in research about
interdependence and cooperation. Scholars have been unable to draw strong inferences about the causal
effect between political relations and trade at the aggregate level because we do not have any exogenous
identification of variation in political relations. We circumvent this problem by comparing trade across
sectors within the same country. Outside of our proposed mechanism, improved relations would have a
similar effect across sectors. In addition, since China and India have only emerged in the past decade
as economic powers with markets large enough to sway other countries, there is less concern about
entrenched patterns of endogenous sanctioning and cooperation. Over time, partners who trade heavily
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in the sectors with large shares of state ownership may experience trade punishment sufficiently often
that they will begin to modify their behavior. Going forward, China and India offer an opportunity to
study the evolution of economic statecraft and diplomatic cooperation.
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Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Trade data
(log) Imports (SOE) 8899 11.56 8.06 −4.61 24.39
(log) Imports (private) 8899 9.30 10.01 −4.61 24.14
(log) Exports (SOE) 8899 15.32 5.03 −4.61 24.17
(log) Exports (private) 8899 13.34 7.99 −4.61 25.14
Variables of interest
(log) GDELT negative events (government) 8185 −8.20 2.07 −9.21 1.26
(log) GDELT negative events (military) 8185 −8.91 1.21 −9.21 −0.00
(log) UNGA voting (ideal point distance) 7595 −0.71 1.29 −10.29 1.51
Yan index 228 3.90 2.32 −2.32 8.10
Control variables
(log) GDP 7542 51.02 2.54 43.17 59.28
(log) Population 8189 36.06 2.24 29.69 41.94
Both in WTO 9397 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Polity 6494 13.05 6.67 0.00 20.00
(log) Distance 8866 8.94 0.57 7.02 9.86
Neighbor 9016 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Common language 9016 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Landlocked 9038 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
US ally 9397 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics: The table presents the number of observations (Obs.), the average value
(Mean), the standard deviation (Std.Dev.), the minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.) of all variables
employed in the empirical analysis for the entire dataset (1991-2012).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Imports Imports Imports Imports
Negative events Negative events UNGA voting Yan index
(government) (military) (ideal point distance)
SOE trade
Political relations -0.0501 -0.2237** -0.2291* 0.1199*
(0.0785) (0.1026) (0.1367) (0.0651)
(log) Distance -0.8303* -0.9192* -0.8204* -0.8292***
(0.5046) (0.5019) (0.4924) (0.1888)
(log) GDP 1.8275*** 1.8354*** 1.8822*** 0.9084***
(0.1724) (0.1649) (0.1713) (0.2128)
(log) Population 0.1245 0.1546 0.0631 -0.5868*
(0.2519) (0.2551) (0.2629) (0.3352)
Neighbor 1.3821 1.5368 1.1572 -0.0929
(1.2745) (1.2803) (1.2593) (0.8002)
Common language 1.7320*** 1.5814*** 1.4604***
(0.5168) (0.5039) (0.5101)
Landlocked -0.5170 -0.5866 -0.3520
(0.6169) (0.6120) (0.6081)
Both in WTO 1.8255* 1.8417* 1.7448 -1.0175***
(1.0554) (1.0544) (1.0727) (0.3654)
Polity -0.1368*** -0.1344*** -0.1289** 0.0223
(0.0516) (0.0509) (0.0533) (0.0300)
US ally 0.0814 0.0579 0.1532 -1.4456***
(0.6257) (0.6138) (0.6157) (0.4891)
Private enterprise trade
Political relations 0.2149*** 0.0769 0.0070 0.2781
(0.0647) (0.0953) (0.1516) (0.3842)
(log) Distance -1.5736*** -1.7440*** -1.8479*** -1.7026***
(0.4266) (0.4520) (0.4444) (0.3249)
(log) GDP 1.6405*** 1.7062*** 1.6997*** 2.1795***
(0.1516) (0.1540) (0.1564) (0.7338)
(log) Population -0.0570 -0.0122 0.0450 -0.1007
(0.2155) (0.2197) (0.2228) (0.6479)
Neighbor 1.0247 1.1291 1.0761 -1.7238
(1.0837) (1.0956) (1.1020) (1.9107)
Common language 4.9713*** 5.1109*** 4.9812***
(0.6027) (0.5999) (0.5903)
Landlocked -0.6144 -0.6291 -0.7144
(0.4703) (0.4763) (0.4728)
Both in WTO 1.7282* 1.6928* 1.7994* -1.9522
(1.0140) (1.0224) (1.0217) (1.3930)
Polity -0.0021 0.0054 -0.0012 -0.1920
(0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0428) (0.1553)
US ally 0.3428 0.2659 0.1924 -1.0260
(0.5278) (0.5376) (0.5191) (1.2572)
Number of observations 2978 2978 2948 240
Wald test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.674
Table 7: Pooled Analysis of Imports to China (1993-2012): Results of a gravity model estimating the
(logged) import value between China and its trading partners with year dummies only (excluding partner
FE). Regressions for SOE and private-sector trade are run as seemingly unrelated estimations. ***
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports Exports Exports Exports
Negative events Negative events UNGA voting Yan index
(government) (military) (ideal point distance)
SOE trade
Political relations 0.0539*** 0.0198 -0.0996** 0.1246***
(0.0208) (0.0269) (0.0436) (0.0418)
(log) Distance -0.3166* -0.3590** -0.3943** -0.7642***
(0.1662) (0.1697) (0.1553) (0.0970)
(log) GDP 0.6418*** 0.6582*** 0.6957*** 0.8450***
(0.0725) (0.0707) (0.0698) (0.1083)
(log) Population 0.2528*** 0.2639*** 0.2413*** -0.3723***
(0.0726) (0.0738) (0.0760) (0.1109)
Neighbor 0.6728 0.6985 0.6681 0.1554
(0.4409) (0.4490) (0.4451) (0.1779)
Common language 1.5811*** 1.6164*** 1.4916***
(0.4854) (0.5004) (0.5384)
Landlocked -0.9407*** -0.9441*** -0.9017***
(0.1936) (0.1960) (0.1937)
Both in WTO -0.0895 -0.0984 -0.1342 0.2230
(0.2628) (0.2670) (0.2735) (0.1661)
Polity -0.0022 -0.0004 0.0040 -0.0228
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0194)
US ally -0.0978 -0.1169 -0.1070 -1.2454***
(0.2246) (0.2263) (0.1987) (0.2730)
Private enterprise trade
Political relations 0.0228 -0.1026 -0.3365*** 0.5021*
(0.0522) (0.0728) (0.0991) (0.2655)
(log) Distance -0.4417 -0.5290* -0.5453* -0.8329**
(0.3125) (0.3188) (0.2932) (0.3971)
(log) GDP 1.1975*** 1.2170*** 1.2653*** 0.8667
(0.1043) (0.0997) (0.1086) (0.5419)
(log) Population 0.1043 0.1309 0.0675 -0.2403
(0.1359) (0.1393) (0.1429) (0.5299)
Neighbor 0.6461 0.7534 0.3938 -3.3999**
(0.7818) (0.7833) (0.7938) (1.3533)
Common language 2.9082*** 2.8595*** 2.6230***
(0.5234) (0.5562) (0.6705)
Landlocked -1.9789*** -2.0198*** -1.7391***
(0.3408) (0.3446) (0.3286)
Both in WTO -0.7013* -0.7008* -0.7921** -2.0421
(0.3910) (0.3913) (0.3897) (1.3865)
Polity 0.0508* 0.0538** 0.0611** -0.0570
(0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0562)
US ally -0.5053 -0.5358 -0.3018 -1.8760
(0.3470) (0.3489) (0.3389) (1.5187)
Number of observations 2978 2978 2948 240
Wald test (p-value) 0.464 0.048 0.002 0.102
Table 8: Pooled Analysis of Exports from China (1993-2012): Results of a gravity model estimating
the (logged) import value between China and its trading partners with year dummies only (excluding
partner FE). Regressions for SOE and private-sector trade are run as seemingly unrelated estimations.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
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